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Abstract: Students who take classes in education departments at universities receive significantly 
higher grades than students who take classes in other academic departments. The higher grades 
awarded by education departments cannot be explained by differences in student quality or by 
structural differences across departments (i.e., differences in class sizes). The remaining 
explanation is that the higher grades are the result of lower grading standards. This paper 
formally documents the grading-standards problem in education departments using 
administrative grade data from the 2007-2008 academic year. Because a large fraction of the 
teachers in K-12 schools receive training in education departments, I briefly discuss several 
possible consequences of the low grading standards for teacher quality in K-12 schools. 
Keywords: grade inflation; teacher training; teacher university training; education department 
grades; education school grades. 
 
Estándares de Evaluación en los Departamentos de Educación en las Universidades  
Resumen: Los estudiantes que estudian en los departamentos de la educación en las universidades 
reciben valoraciones muy superiores a los estudiantes que estudian en otros departamentos. Las 
calificaciones más altas dadas por departamentos de educación no se pueden explicar por las 
diferencias de calidad de los estudiantes o de las diferencias estructurales entre los departamentos 
(diferencias en el tamaño de clases, por ejemplo). En este artículo se investiga formalmente el 
problema de los estándares de evaluación en departamentos de la educación mediante el uso de los 
datos de evaluación  académica en el período 2007-2008. Como muchos profesores de educación 
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básica (K-12) son formados en departamentos de formación docente, también se discuten las 
consecuencias de el bajo nivel de evaluación sobre la calidad de los maestros en educación básica (K-
12) 
Palabras clave: inflación evaluación; la formación profesor; la universidad de formación del 
profesorado; evaluaciones del departamento de educación; puntuaciones educación universitaria.  
 
Padrões de Avaliação nos Departamentos de Educação nas Universidades 
Resumo: Os alunos que estudam nos departamentos de educação nas universidades recebem 
avaliações muito mais altas do que os alunos que estudam em outros departamentos. As avaliações 
maiores dadas pelos departamentos de educação não podem ser explicadas pelas diferenças de 
qualidade do aluno ou pelas diferenças estruturais entre departamentos (diferenças de tamanho das 
classes, por exemplo). Este artigo investiga formalmente o problema de padrões de avaliação nos 
departamentos de educação usando dados de avaliação administrativa no período acadêmico 2007-
2008. Como grande parte dos professores nas escolas K-12 recebem treinamento nos departamentos 
de educação, discuto também várias consequências possíveis dos baixos padrões de avaliação para a 
qualidade do professor nas escolas K-12. 
Palavras-chave: inflação de avaliação; treinamento de professor; treinamento de professor 
universitário; avaliações do departamento de educação; avaliações do colégio de educação. 
Introduction 
There is a large and growing research literature showing that teacher quality is an important 
determinant of student success (recent studies include Aaronson et al., 2007; Koedel, 2008; Nye et 
al., 2004; Rivkin et al., 2005; Rockoff, 2004). But while there is persistent research into a variety of 
interventions aimed at improving teacher quality, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the 
primary training ground for K-12 teachers—education departments at universities. This paper 
provides an evaluation of the grading standards in these education departments. I show that 
education students receive higher grades than do students in every other academic discipline. The 
grading discrepancies that I document cannot be explained by differences between education and 
non-education departments in student quality, or by structural differences across departments. The 
likely explanation is grade inflation.  
The earliest evidence on the grading-standards problem in education departments comes 
from Weiss and Rasmussen in 1960. They showed that undergraduate students taking classes in 
education departments were twice as likely to receive an “A” when compared to students taking 
classes in business or liberal arts departments. The low grading standards in education departments, 
illustrated by these authors over 50 years ago, are still prevalent today.  
I document the disparity in current grading standards between education departments and 
twelve other academic departments that are common to most universities using administrative data 
from the 2007-2008 academic year. The comparison departments include (1) math, science and 
economics departments: biology, chemistry, computer science, economics, mathematics and physics; 
(2) social-science departments: political science, psychology and sociology; and (3) humanities 
departments: English, history and philosophy.1 With great consistency, the data show that the grades 
awarded by education departments are substantially higher than the grades awarded by all other 
academic departments. 
                                                
1 Although economics is a social science, the grade distributions in economics are much more similar to the 
hard sciences, and as such, they are grouped together for the analysis here. 
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The primary purpose of this paper is to highlight the magnitude of the current grading-
standards discrepancy between education and non-education departments. Anecdotally, although 
most people seem to be aware that grading standards are lower in education departments, the 
magnitude of the difference does not seem to be well understood. It would also be of interest to 
evaluate the policy implications of the low grading standards in education departments – for 
example, they are likely to affect the quality of the K-12 teaching workforce. But a formal analysis 
along these lines seems virtually impossible given current data conditions. More concretely, there 
appears to be little in the way of meaningful variation in grading standards across education 
departments at different universities (see below), or within education departments over time (Weiss 
and Rasmussen, 1960). Without this variation, researchers cannot evaluate the counterfactual impact 
of more-stringent grading standards in education departments. The lack of variation in the data, and 
the corresponding lack of rigorous research on this topic, however, should not be viewed as a 
verdict on the importance of the grading-standards problem. The low grading standards in education 
departments may have a large impact on the delivery of K-12 education in the United States despite 
our difficulty in formally evaluating this issue. 
Although data limitations prevent a formal analysis, I draw on evidence from the broader 
research literature to consider several ways that the low grading standards in education departments 
may affect teacher quality in K-12 schools. First, Babcock (2010) shows that grade inflation in 
college reduces student effort, which in turn, reduces human-capital accumulation (Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2008). 2 Under fairly modest conditions, lower human-capital accumulation among 
prospective teachers in college will negatively affect teacher quality in K-12 schools. Second, there is 
a striking similarity between the low grading standards in education departments and the low 
evaluation standards for teachers in the workforce (see, for example, Harris and Sass, 2010; Jacob 
and Lefgren, 2008; TNTP, 2009). Murphy and Cleveland (1991) indicate that employee evaluations 
can be affected by contextual norms – if the low grading standards to which prospective K-12 
teachers are exposed in college affect their expectations in the workforce, this may affect their 
evaluations in schools. The low evaluation standards for teachers in K-12 schools have been 
identified as a likely impediment to student achievement by The New Teacher Project (TNTP, 
2009). Finally, the grading standards in education departments are so low that grades cannot be used 
to meaningfully distinguish students. In other departments, grades signal information about 
performance to students, allowing them to sort into disciplines for which they are well-matched 
(Arcidiacono, 2004; Michaels, 1976). There appears to be no such role for grades in education 
departments—students who are poorly-matched for teaching careers are unlikely to receive any 
indication that this is the case in their grade reports.3 
Data 
In my primary analysis I evaluate data from three large, public universities that have sizeable 
undergraduate programs in education – Indiana University, Bloomington; Miami University, Oxford 
(Ohio); and the University of Missouri, Columbia. Total enrollments at these universities in the fall 
of 2007 were approximately 39,000, 16,000 and 28,000, respectively. The dataset includes the 
                                                
2 Although Babcock provides the only causal estimates of the effects of grading standards in college on 
student effort of which I am aware, similar results are found elsewhere. For example, Figlio and Lucas (2004) 
show that students benefit from higher grading standards in elementary schools. 
3 Arcidiacono (2004) shows that students sort across college majors using information about grades, which is 
consistent with grades providing information to individuals about their relative strengths and weaknesses. In a 
different context, Michaels (1976) provides a general discussion of the role of grades at universities, 
specifically noting their role in sorting students. 
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universe of undergraduate classroom-level grade reports from administrative data for each university 
for the 2007-2008 academic year. I use these grade reports to characterize the distributions of 
classroom-level grades awarded by academic department.4   
I compare the grade distributions found in the education departments to those in the 12 
academic departments listed above. These departments were chosen to ensure that the major 
academic departments found at most universities are represented in the data. In results omitted for 
brevity, I show that adding additional smaller departments to the comparisons, such as anthropology 
or human studies, does not affect the findings.  
All three universities designate a level ranging from one to four for each undergraduate class. 
The levels roughly correspond to first-year, second-year, third-year, and fourth-year classes. I focus 
on all classes that are designated as level-2 or higher because education departments offer very few 
level-1 classes. Because the level assigned to most classes beyond the introductory level will be 
endogenous to some extent (e. g. , most classes that are designated as level-4 could also be 
designated as level-3, and vice versa), I do not distinguish by course-level in the analysis. However, 
note that class-level designations are of no consequence to the results—my findings can be 
replicated within class-level.  
Table 1 reports the average class size, the number of classrooms observed, and the number 
of student-by-classroom observations for each department-by-university in the primary dataset. 
Overall, the data include grade reports from 2,902 classrooms across the three universities, 665 of 
which are education classes. Over 100,000 student-by-classroom observations underlie the 
classroom-level grade reports. 
The three universities that are the focus of the primary analysis are a convenience sample – 
these universities post classroom-level grades and enrollment information online. Most universities 
do not make such data available; but at considerable expense, Myedu.com has constructed a 
database with course-level grade information for all of the major public universities in the United 
States.5 Below, I use the Myedu.com data to confirm that the grade distributions from the education 
departments in the convenience sample are not unique.  
Grade Distributions 
Table 2 reports classroom-level average GPAs, unweighted and weighted by classroom 
enrollments, and the distribution of classroom-level GPAs by university and department-group. The 
simple-average GPAs are calculated as , where n indexes classrooms, j indexes 
departments, Nj indicates the number of classroom observations in department j, and J indicates the 
number of departments in each group. The enrollment-weighted averages weight each classroom-
level GPA by enrollment before taking the across-group average. The weighted and unweighted 
averages are always very similar and to the extent that they differ, the weighted GPA comparisons 
suggest even larger GPA gaps between education and other departments. Comparisons at the 
individual-department level are shown in Appendix Table A.1. 
                                                
4 I use the term “classroom” to mean “lecture” – that is, I do not treat teaching-assistant “sections” of the 
same lecture as separate classes.  
5 Myedu.com collects administrative grade data directly from universities by invoking the Freedom of 
Information Act (in most cases). Although the information they collect is “free”, they are required to pay the 
costs associated with processing their data requests at each university, which are often in the thousands of 
dollars. Myedu.com also expends considerable effort to ensure that they are getting the proper information 
from each university. 
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Table 2 shows that there are substantial differences in the grade distributions between 
education and non-education departments. The classroom-level average GPAs in the education 
departments are 0.5 to 0. 8 grade points higher than in the other department groups. The GPA gaps 
are even larger at the bottom of the distribution. 
Figure 1 graphically illustrates the grade distributions at each university in the convenience 
sample. The graphs in the figure are cluttered, but that is largely the point: while all other university 
departments work in one space, education departments work in another. Notice that it is generally 
difficult to distinguish which department is which, with the exception that the distributions from the 
education departments are quite obvious. 
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Table 1.  
Average Class Sizes, Numbers of Classrooms Observed, and Numbers of Student-by-Classroom Observations that Underlie the Grade Report Data by University 
and Department.  
  Math and Science Related Majors Social Science Majors Humanities Majors 
 Educ Bio* Chem* Comp Sci Econ Math Physics Poly Sci Psych Soc Eng Hist Phil 
Indiana Univ              
Avg. Class Size 20.0 51.6 88.3 16.9 68.2 31.4 56.5 43.0 46.5 49.4 22.7 40.5 24.9 
Number of Classes 451 75 34 50 100 77 31 68 114 53 198 92 28 
              
Student-by-
Classroom Obs. 9020 3870 3002 845 6820 2418 1752 2924 5301 2618 4495 3726 697 
              
Miami Univ (OH)              
Avg. Class Size 21.3 22.2* 55.4* 16.9 43.9 21.4 15.7 34.9 35.0 23.4 24.1 26.5 21.5 
Number of Classes 120 21* 36* 39 93 67 11 88 101 35 132 74 19 
              
Student-by-
Classroom Obs.  2556 466* 1994* 659 4083 1434 173 3071 3535 819 3181 1961 409 
              
Univ of Missouri              
Avg. Class Size 29.7 51.6 115.3 27.0 64.6 23.4 80.2 44.7 73.5 70.2 20.0 44.6 30.1 
Number of Classes 94 48 16 26 33 66 14 49 79 42 142 57 29 
              
Student-by-
Classroom Obs.  2792 2477 1845 702 2132 1544 1123 2190 5807 2948 2840 2542 873 
* Miami University (OH) does not have a biology department and combines its chemistry and biochemistry departments. In place of the biology 
department, I use the microbiology department, and I report data from the “chemistry and biochemistry” department under the “chemistry” label. 
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Table 2.  
GPA Comparisons Between Education and Other Department Groups.  
 Education Math, Science, 
Economics  
Social Sciences Humanities 
Indiana University     
Weighted Average GPA 3.65 2.88 3.07 2.98 
Simple Average GPA 3.66 3.05 3.17 3.07 
GPA Gap (simple average)  0.61 0.49 0.59 
90th percentile 3.98 3.63 3.79 3.57 
75th percentile 3.91 3.37 3.41 3.33 
25th percentile 3.49 2.71 2.89 2.79 
10th percentile 3.27 2.52 2.69 2.61 
Average Class Size 20.0 52.2 46.3 29.4 
Average # of Classes per Dept 451 61.2 78.3 106.0 
     
Miami Univ (OH)     
Weighted Average GPA 3.71 2.89 3.00 3.17 
Simple Average GPA 3.73 2.91 3.05 3.20 
GPA Gap (simple average)  0.82 0.68 0.53 
90th percentile 4.00 3.39 3.61 3.63 
75th percentile 3.95 3.18 3.38 3.39 
25th percentile 3.58 2.64 2.69 3.00 
10th percentile 3.28 2.43 2.49 2.76 
Average Class Size 21.3 29.3 31.1 24.0 
Average # of Classes per Dept 120 44.5 74.7 75.0 
     
Univ of Missouri     
Weighted Average GPA 3.73 2.92 3.03 3.12 
Simple Average GPA 3.80 2.99 3.12 3.16 
GPA Gap (simple average)  0.81 0.68 0.64 
90th percentile 4.00 3.52 3.55 3.65 
75th percentile 3.97 3.25 3.37 3.40 
25th percentile 3.71 2.69 2.88 2.89 
10th percentile 3.50 2.55 2.71 2.66 
Average Class Size 29.7 60.4 62.8 31.6 
Average # of Classes per Dept 94 33.8 56.7 76.0 
Notes: Majors included in the “Math, Science, Economics” group are biology, chemistry, computer science, 
economics, math and physics. Majors included in the “Social Sciences” group are political science, psychology 
and sociology. Majors included in the “Humanities” group are English, history and political science. 
Appendix Table A.1 reports disaggregated departmental data. 
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Figure 1.  
Probability Density Functions of Classroom-Level GPAs by University and Department, Shown from GPA =1 to GPA =4. The Graphs are for Grade 
Distributions at Indiana University, University of Miami (Ohio), and University of Missouri. Education Departments are denoted by solid lines; Math and 
Science Departments are denoted by dashed lines; Social Science Departments are denoted by x’s; Humanities Departments are denoted by circles. 
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Figure 2 confirms that the grade distributions for the education departments in Figure 1 are 
not unique. It shows grade distributions from ten other education departments using data from 
Myedu.com. Myedu.com was willing to share their data for the purposes of this research, but had 
some reservations about identifying individual universities. Ultimately, they agreed to provide grade 
distributions from ten unidentified education departments, randomly drawn from a larger sample of 
50 education departments at major public universities. These are the distributions that are shown in 
Figure 2 (the universities in the larger 50-school sample are reported in Appendix B). The course-
level average GPA across the ten education departments in Figure 2, weighted by course 
enrollments within university, is 3.60 (the unweighted average is 3.66). All of the grade distributions 
in the figure are strongly negatively skewed.6  
Several explanations for the observed GPA gaps between education and non-education 
departments, beyond pure grade inflation, merit discussion. First, the GPA gaps could be justified if 
education departments draw students who, on average, are of higher quality than students in other 
academic departments. However, the available evidence suggests that this explanation is unlikely. 
For example, Arcidiacono (2004) uses a nationally representative dataset to show that education 
majors enter college with considerably lower SAT scores, on average, than students in other 
disciplines. Similar evidence is available from The College Board (2010), which compares college-
bound high-school seniors by intended major. Although SAT scores surely do not measure every 
dimension of quality, the documented discrepancies in SAT scores between education and non-
education majors are not consistent with education students being of higher-quality than students in 
other disciplines.7  
A second explanation for the GPA gaps is that they are the result of a structural difference 
between education and non-education departments. An obvious difference that can be seen from 
Table 1 is that education departments generally offer smaller classes than other departments. If 
smaller classes correspond to better grades, some of the GPA discrepancies may be attributable to 
this structural difference. To evaluate this possibility I begin by estimating the correlation between 
class size and classroom-level GPA using the following regression model, estimated separately for 
each of the three universities in the primary data sample: 
  (1) 
In (1), the GPA in classroom i, taught in department j at level p during semester t, is regressed on 
enrollment (that is, class size), , and fixed effects for semester (fall or spring— ) and 
department-by-level ( ). This regression identifies systematic differences in grades between 
courses that differ in size but are taught by the same department and at the same level.  
                                                
6 Because of the way that the data are stored by myedu.com, it was easiest for them to extract grades at the 
course-number level, not the classroom level. Therefore, the grade data from myedu.com are aggregated to a 
higher level than are the data in Figures 1 and 2 (a single course will often correspond to more than one 
class). Descriptively, this is of little practical importance. Also, because of heterogeneity in the numbering 
sequences across universities, Myedu.com did not attempt to filter out freshman-level courses. Again, this is 
of little practical importance because there are very few freshman-level education courses. 
7 Arcidiacono (2004) reports average math and verbal SAT scores for science, business, social-
science/humanities and education majors upon college entry. For math, the average scores by major are 566, 
498, 500, and 458, respectively; the average verbal scores are 499, 444, 481 and 431. The College Board (2010) 
provides an even more-detailed comparison using more recent data –the SAT-score gaps reported by The 
College Board (2010) are very similar to those reported by Arcidiacono (2004). 
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Figure 2.  
Undergraduate Course-Level Grade Distributions from 2007-2008 at Ten Education Departments (Randomly 
Drawn from a Sample of Education Departments at 50 Large, Public Universities—see Appendix B). The Average 
Course-Level GPA across Education Departments is Approximately 3.66 Unweighted, and 3.60 Weighted. 
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Because there is so little variation in the grades assigned in education departments relative to 
other departments, I omit education classrooms from the regression. Therefore, the correlations 
captured by  can be interpreted as indicating the university-wide relationships between class size 
and GPA, measured within department and level, and outside of education departments. I use the 
estimates of  from each university to adjust the classroom-level grade reports for differences in 
class size, meaning that any remaining differences will be attributable to something else. 
 Perhaps not surprisingly,  is negative and statistically significant in all three regressions, 
which means that smaller classes are indeed associated with higher grades. The association is likely 
attributable to both causal and non-causal factors. For example, smaller classes may cause better 
grades by improving instructors’ abilities to monitor students, facilitating different instructional 
philosophies, or by increasing the social stigma attached to poor performance. Conversely, a non-
causal explanation is that departments teach selective classes on advanced topics, and purposefully 
limit enrollment to their most able students. If the relationship between class size and GPA is 
entirely causal, adjusting the GPA gaps for the differences in class sizes between education and non-
education departments will provide a more-accurate comparison. However, to the extent that the 
correlation is not causal, and simply represents the effect of student sorting by class size, adjusting 
the GPA gaps based on the output from equation (1) will likely overcompensate for the structural 
component, and understate the grade-inflation problem.8   
Table 3 reports GPA gaps that are adjusted for the class-size discrepancies between 
education and non-education departments using the estimates of  from equation (1). Although 
the adjusted GPA gaps are slightly smaller, they are still large. This suggests that the GPA gaps are 
not explained by differences in class sizes between education and non-education departments.  
 
Table 3.  
Class-Size Adjusted GPA Gaps between Education Departments and Each Department Group at Each 
University, Based on Simple Averages.  
 Math, Science, 
Economics  
Social Sciences Humanities 
Indiana University     
GPA Gap 0.61 0.49 0.59 
Class-Size Adjusted  0.57 0.46 0.58 
    
Miami Univ (OH)     
GPA Gap 0.82 0.68 0.53 
Class-Size Adjusted  0.80 0.67 0.52 
    
Univ of Missouri     
GPA Gap 0.81 0.68 0.64 
Class-Size Adjusted  0.76 0.63 0.64 
 
                                                
8 In theory, the bias from the adjustment could go in the other direction if academic departments sorted their 
least-able students into smaller classes. However, in practice, departments appear to be much more likely to 
offer smaller classes to their advanced students. 
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It may also be that fundamental differences in instructional practice between education and 
non-education departments influence the grade distributions. One possible difference is in 
instructional philosophy. As a specific example, the mastery-learning framework is likely to be more 
common in education departments. Within the mastery-learning framework, class topics are handled 
discretely and students who have difficulty with a given topic receive additional instruction until they 
succeed. The underlying philosophy that all students can master the topics of the course suggests 
that grades in courses that are taught under the mastery-learning framework will be higher. While in 
principle any professor in any discipline can adopt the mastery-learning approach, or something 
similar, mastery-learning courses are likely to be more common in education departments because 
(1) the sizeable research literature on mastery learning is in education and (2) the mastery-learning 
approach may be a more reasonable fit for education classes based on course content.9 
 A second issue related to instructional practice involves the prevalence of practice-based 
and/or internship courses in degree programs in education and non-education departments. Relative 
to other academic disciplines, the nature of the training in education departments is likely to require 
more practice-based courses. Grades in such courses can either be assigned as pass/fail, in which 
case they are not factored into student GPAs, or as letter grades. In the latter case, it seems likely 
that “A’s” will be commonly awarded to indicate satisfactory completion, meaning that such classes 
will cause some grade inflation. 
 Unfortunately, I cannot investigate the effects on the grade distributions of differences in 
instructional philosophies across academic departments because data are not available (for education 
or other departments). However, this seems like a logical starting point for future work that attempts 
to identify why the grading discrepancies that I document above exist. Alternatively, using data from 
the University of Missouri and Miami University, where course descriptions are available, I can 
evaluate the role of practice-based courses in determining the education-department grade 
distributions.10 At Miami University, the courses that are clearly labeled as practice-based courses in 
the administrative data are graded on a pass-fail basis, which means that they are not included in the 
analysis above. At the University of Missouri, the practice-based courses do appear to be graded—if 
I omit them from the GPA calculations, the average course-level GPA for the Missouri education 
department declines by just 0.02 grade points. Clearly, the grading discrepancies are not driven by 
differences across departments in the prevalence of practice-based courses. 
 Finally, I briefly raise a conceptual issue regarding mechanisms. While it is important to 
understand the mechanisms that underlie the grade distributions, only in cases where the mechanism 
is outside of the control of the faculty in academic departments is it reasonable to make an 
adjustment to the grade distributions. The first two mechanisms considered above – departmental 
differences in student quality and class size – are plausibly outside of faculty control.11 However, the 
latter two mechanisms—differences in instructional philosophy and the prevalence and grading of 
practice-based courses—are determined by faculty. For example, any professor in any discipline can 
                                                
9 The literature on mastery learning dates back to the 1970s – see, for example, Bloom (1974) or Block and 
Anderson (1975). There is some argument in the literature as to its merits (see, for example, Kulik et al., 1990; 
Slavin, 1987). 
10 The data from Indiana University do not provide enough of a description of the course to categorize 
internship or practice-based courses. Also, it may be that some practice-based courses are not clearly labeled 
in the data from the other two universities, in which case I will not know to treat them as such. 
11 Very broadly considered, even these two mechanisms can be affected by faculty, but if we assume that 
faculty do not affect individual preferences for major choice, and if we assume that class-size differences are 
related to discipline-specific training needs, then these two mechanisms can be plausibly treated as being 
outside of faculty control. 
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adopt a teaching philosophy that leads to higher student grades. Similarly, departments have some 
discretion over the role and prevalence of practice-based courses in their degree programs, and 
equally importantly, over how these courses are graded (i.e., by letter grade or pass-fail). The choices 
that are made by faculty across departments contribute to the across-department grading 
discrepancies that are highlighted by this study.  
Potential Implications of the Low Grading Standards in Education 
Departments 
The previous section documents sizeable differences in the grading standards between 
education and non-education departments. Unfortunately, an empirical evaluation of the policy 
implications seems virtually impossible given that the counterfactual of more-stringent grading 
standards does not appear to exist in a meaningful way. For example, the low grading standards in 
education departments may adversely affect the quality of the K-12 teaching workforce; however, 
the data lack sufficient variation to investigate this possibility. 
Although I cannot provide direct evidence on the link between the grading standards in 
education departments and teacher quality in K-12 schools, I draw on the larger research literature 
to provide indirect evidence. Most notably, in the general university context, Babcock (2010) shows 
that student effort responds negatively to low grading standards. He shows that when students’ 
grade expectations rise by one grade point, effort decreases by roughly 20 percent (measured by 
study time). Extrapolating linearly from Babcock’s result, I predict the effort responses from 
education students that would accompany more stringent grading standards in education 
departments. A qualification to this analysis, shown in Table 4, is that there are many reasons to 
expect Babcock’s analysis to understate students’ effort responses. As such, the predictions in the 
table should perhaps be viewed as lower bounds.12   
First consider the case where each education department from the convenience sample 
raised its grading standards to be in line with the next-highest grading department at the same 
university. The corresponding reductions in classroom-level average GPAs in the education 
departments at Indiana, Miami and Missouri would be 0.42, 0.26 and 0.54, respectively. Applying 
Babcock’s estimate, these differences would correspond to effort increases of between 5 and 11 
percent by undergraduate education students. At the other extreme, if the education departments 
raised their grading standards to be in line with the lowest-grading departments at their respective 
universities, effort would increase by 17 to 23 percent. Perhaps a reasonable expectation is that 
education departments bring their grading standards in line with humanities departments, which 
appear to most closely resemble education departments in terms of class sizes and grades. In this 
case, student effort in education departments would increase by 11 to 13 percent.  
Under fairly modest assumptions, increases in effort during prospective teachers’ 
undergraduate training will increase teacher quality in K-12 schools. First, trivially, increased effort 
must correspond to increased learning, which appears to be the case (general evidence is available 
from Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2008). Second, it must be that either (1) a better 
understanding of the content of classes taught in education departments improves teacher quality, or 
(2) that indirectly, teachers gain other skills as a result of a more-demanding college experience (e.g., 
skills in time-management or improved work ethics). I am not aware of any direct evidence that 
                                                
12 The main reason to expect Babcock’s findings to understate the effect of increased grading standards is that 
he identifies his effect using within instructor-course variation. It is also likely that between-instructor and 
between-course variation in grading standards will be important – his estimates that use this variation are 
almost twice as large (but they are also more likely to be biased). 
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confirms either of these latter points, although recent data collection efforts will facilitate studies 
that can provide insight in the near future.13 
 
Table 4.  
Predicted Effort Responses to Adjustments to Grading Standards in Education Departments, Based on Simple 
Averages.  
 Indiana Univ Miami Univ (OH) Univ of Missouri 
Education Dept Avg GPA  3.66 3.73 3.80 
    
Next-Highest-Grading Department Avg GPA 3.24  
(Psych) 
3.47  
(English) 
3.26 
 (Psych) 
GPA Adjustment Required to Close Gap 0.42 0.26 0.54 
Predicted Effort Increase (%) 8 5 11 
    
Lowest-Grading Department Avg GPA 2.79  
(Econ) 
2.58  
(Econ) 
2.83 
 (Math) 
GPA Adjustment Required to Close Gap 0.87 1.15 0.97 
Predicted Effort Increase (%) 17 23 19 
    
Math and Science Departments Avg GPA  3.05 2.91 2.99 
GPA Adjustment Required to Close Gap 0.61 0.82 0.81 
Predicted Effort Increase (%) 12 16 16 
    
Social Science Departments Avg GPA 3.17 3.05 3.12 
GPA Adjustment Required to Close Gap 0.49 0.68 0.68 
Predicted Effort Increase (%) 10 14 14 
    
Humanities Departments Avg GPA  3.07 3.20 3.16 
GPA Adjustment Required to Close Gap 0.59 0.53 0.64 
Predicted Effort Increase (%) 12 11 13 
 
There may also be other consequences of the low grading standards in education 
departments. For one, grades do not provide meaningful information to students about their relative 
performance in education classes, meaning that students cannot use their grades to evaluate their fit 
in the discipline. Among the general college population, Arcidiacono (2004) empirically establishes 
that grades play a role in helping students sort into college majors. In education, however, students 
who are not a good fit for the discipline will receive no indication that this is the case from their 
grade reports. 
Another possibility that merits attention from policymakers and higher-education 
administrators is that the low grading standards in education departments may contribute to the 
culture of low evaluation standards in education more generally. Although the existence of such a 
link is merely speculative at this point, there is a striking similarity between the favorable grades 
awarded to prospective teachers during university training and the favorable evaluations that 
teachers receive in K-12 schools. To illustrate the low evaluation standards for K-12 teachers I draw 
                                                
13 In fact, several states can link teachers to their training institutions, undergraduate and otherwise (examples 
include Florida, Louisiana, Missouri and Tennessee). Some are already attempting to determine what aspects 
of training improve teacher performance.  
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on several studies in the literature. First, Jacob and Lefgren (2008) show that school principals 
consistently award favorable ratings to teachers. In their study, principals from a Midwestern school 
district were asked to rate each teacher’s overall effectiveness on a 10-point scale. Principals were 
given the following descriptions to guide them in assigning their ratings:  
 
1-2: Inadequate—The teacher performs substantially below minimal standards. 
3-5: Adequate—The teacher meets minimal standards (but could make substantial 
improvements). 
6-8: Very good—The teacher is highly effective. 
9-10: Exceptional—The teacher is among the best I have ever seen (e.g., in the top 1% of 
teachers). 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of principals’ actual ratings of teachers. As can be seen from 
the figure, the evaluations are overwhelmingly positive. Even the 30th percentile teacher, who is well 
below the median, received an eight; and roughly 40 percent of the teachers received an “exceptional” 
rating, described as indicating that the teacher’s performance is in the top 1 percent. 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of Principal’s Ratings of Teachers on a 10-Point Scale, taken from Jacob and 
Lefgren (2008).  
 
Findings consistent with those from Jacob and Lefgren (2008) are available elsewhere. For 
example, Harris and Sass (2010) survey principals in a different school district and obtain similar 
results (Harris and Sass (2010) report that the average teacher rating on a nine-point scale exceeds 
7.0).14 And in 2009, The New Teacher Project documented teacher evaluations at 12 school districts 
across four states (TNTP, 2009). The TNTP report notes that “in districts that use binary evaluation 
ratings (generally “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory”), more than 99 percent of teachers receive the 
satisfactory rating. Districts that use a broader range of rating options do little better; in these 
districts, 94 percent of teachers receive one of the top two ratings and less than 1 percent are rated 
unsatisfactory” (TNTP, p. 6). 
                                                
14 Note that neither of these studies was designed with the explicit objective of examining the low standards by 
which teachers are evaluated in K-12 schools. 
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Murphy and Cleveland (1991) suggest a mechanism by which the low grading standards in 
education departments may affect teacher evaluations in K-12 schools. Namely, the low grading 
standards may contribute to a cultural norm within the education sector: Murphy and Cleveland 
(1991) write “in an organization where the norm is to give high ratings, the rater who defies the 
norm might experience disapproval from his or her peers…pressures for non-conformity may be a 
significant factor in rating inflation” (Murphy and Cleveland, p. 197). Murphy and Cleveland (1991) 
also suggest that strongly held beliefs about how appraisals should be done within an organization 
“may make it difficult to change the appraisal system …” (Murphy and Cleveland, p. 181). Although 
no causal link can be established given current data, it is worth considering the possibility that 
prospective teachers’ lack of exposure to critical evaluations during their university training translates 
into expectations that they continue to receive non-critical evaluations in the workforce.15 
Conclusion 
This paper uses recent administrative grade data to document large GPA gaps between 
education departments and other academic departments at universities. Classroom-level average 
GPAs in education departments are on the order of 0.5 to 0.8 grade points higher than in other 
departments. The GPA gaps do not appear to be explained by differences in student quality across 
departments, nor are they driven by the fact that classes in education departments are typically 
smaller. The remaining explanation is that the higher GPAs in education classes are the result of low 
grading standards in education departments.  
The contribution of this study is to empirically document the low grading standards in 
education departments. Much work remains in the areas of identifying mechanisms and 
understanding policy consequences. In terms of the former, the issue of differences across 
departments in instructional philosophy seems like an obvious starting point. Additionally, a better 
understanding of how faculty in different departments perceive the role of grades may provide 
useful insights. 
Understanding of the policy consequences of the favorable grades awarded by education 
departments is also important. Because the vast majority of education majors go on to work as 
classroom teachers, a first-order issue is to determine if and how the low grading standards in 
education departments affect teacher quality in K-12 schools. Based on the larger research literature 
I suggest some of the most likely possibilities. These include that the low grading standards (1) 
reduce human-capital accumulation during college for prospective teachers, (2) result in inaccurate 
performance signals being sent to students in education classes, and (3) affect evaluation standards 
for teachers in the workforce. There is a considerable research basis for making the connections in 
(1) and (2), although again, there is no direct evidence. Linking the low grading standards in 
education departments to the low evaluation standards for teachers in the workforce is more 
speculative, although there is some support in the literature for this possibility as well. 
In conclusion, the rationale for the low grading standards in education departments is 
unclear. Rather than asking why these grading standards should be changed, perhaps the more 
reasonable policy question is this: why shouldn’t the grading standards in education departments be changed? 
Beyond noting that the current system has considerable inertia, what benefits does it confer? Or, put 
                                                
15 There is a large literature in economics, management and psychology showing that performance evaluations 
for all workers tend to be inflated and compressed, so this problem is not unique to education (see, for 
example, Murphy and Cleveland, 1991). Nonetheless, the evaluations for teachers seem particularly lenient 
and compressed (TNTP, 2009). It is noteworthy that some of the checks and balances that reduce ratings 
leniency and compression in the private sector are absent in the public sector, including education (for 
example, see Murphy and Cleveland, 1991; Prendergast, 2002). 
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differently, if we were to start over with university education, and could choose the grading 
distributions in each discipline, would we choose the currently-observed discrepancy between 
education departments and all other academic departments at universities? 
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Appendix A 
Supplementary Tables 
Appendix Table A. 1.  
Comparisons Between Education and Non-Education Departments.  
  Math and Science Related Majors Social Science Majors Humanities Majors 
 Education Biology* Chemistry* Computer 
Science 
Economics Math Physics Political 
Science 
Psychology Sociology English History Philosophy 
Indiana University              
Simple Average GPA 3.66 3.20 2.94 3.15 2.79 3.02 3.19 3.14 3.24 3.12 3.23 3.06 2.92 
90th percentile 3.98 3.87 3.36 3.89 3.47 3.57 3.64 3.67 3.97 3.74 3.70 3.61 3.39 
75th percentile 3.91 3.57 3.17 3.59 3.05 3.26 3.56 3.34 3.59 3.31 3.49 3.29 3.21 
25th percentile 3.49 2.82 2.75 2.78 2.43 2.72 2.75 2.87 2.93 2.86 2.94 2.81 2.62 
10th percentile 3.27 2.55 2.52 2.54 2.27 2.55 2.68 2.75 2.66 2.67 2.78 2.65 2.39 
Average Class Size 20.0 51.6 88.3 16.9 68.2 31.4 56.5 43.0 46.5 49.4 22.7 40.5 24.9 
Number of Classes 451 75 34 50 100 77 31 68 114 53 198 92 28 
Student-by-Classroom Obs 9020 3870 3002 845 6820 2418 1752 2924 5301 2618 4495 3726 697 
              
Miami Univ (OH)              
Simple Average GPA 3.73 2.82* 3.07* 2.86 2.58 2.92 3.23 3.12 3.00 3.02 3.47 3.12 3.02 
90th percentile 4.00 3.14* 3.67* 3.35 2.95 3.57 3.65 3.65 3.51 3.67 3.84 3.51 3.54 
75th percentile 3.95 2.94* 3.55* 3.14 2.75 3.24 3.46 3.43 3.34 3.37 3.67 3.32 3.18 
25th percentile 3.58 2.60* 2.73* 2.60 2.38 2.61 2.90 2.87 2.66 2.53 3.26 2.90 2.84 
10th percentile 3.28 2.48* 2.40* 2.26 2.15 2.41 2.86 2.63 2.46 2.38 3.04 2.75 2.48 
Average Class Size 21.3 22.2* 55.4* 16.9 43.9 21.4 15.7 34.9 35.0 23.4 24.1 26.5 21.5 
Number of Classes 120 21* 36* 39 93 67 11 88 101 35 132 74 19 
Student-by-Classroom Obs 2556 466* 1994* 659 4083 1434 173 3071 3535 819 3181 1961 409 
              
              
Univ of Missouri              
Simple Average GPA 3.80 3.18 2.86 2.96 2.94 2.83 3.19 2.95 3.26 3.15 3.19 3.12 3.16 
90th percentile 4.00 3.73 3.52 3.37 3.45 3.29 3.74 3.37 3.80 3.48 3.67 3.71 3.57 
75th percentile 3.97 3.53 3.20 3.14 3.15 3.03 3.44 3.14 3.60 3.36 3.45 3.32 3.43 
25th percentile 3.71 2.84 2.58 2.73 2.63 2.61 2.77 2.75 2.93 2.95 2.96 2.89 2.82 
10th percentile 3.50 2.72 2.38 2.62 2.47 2.39 2.72 2.53 2.79 2.81 2.70 2.59 2.68 
Average Class Size 29.7 51.6 115.3 27.0 64.6 23.4 80.2 44.7 73.5 70.2 20.0 44.6 30.1 
Number of Classes 94 48 16 26 33 66 14 49 79 42 142 57 29 
Student-by-Classroom Obs 2792 2477 1845 702 2132 1544 1123 2190 5807 2948 2840 2542 873 
* Miami University (OH) does not have a biology department and combines its chemistry and biochemistry departments. In place of the biology 
department, I use the microbiology department, and I report data from the “chemistry and biochemistry” department under the “chemistry” label.  
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Appendix B 
The 50-University “Universe” for Figure 2  
 
 
Distributions from education departments at 10 randomly drawn universities from this 
sample are shown in Figure 2. The three universities shown in Figure 1 were purposefully 
omitted from this sample.  
 
 
 
Arizona State University, Tempe Campus 
Boise State University 
Bowling Green State University - Main Campus 
California State University, Fresno 
California State University, Fullerton 
California State University, Northridge 
Florida Atlantic University 
Florida International University 
Florida State University 
Georgia State University 
Illinois State University 
Kennesaw State University 
Kent State University 
Louisiana State University 
Michigan State University 
North Carolina State University at Raleigh 
Northern Arizona University 
Ohio University 
Oklahoma State University - Stillwater 
Purdue University - Main Campus 
Sam Houston State University 
Texas A&M University 
Texas State University, San Marcos 
Texas Tech University 
The University of Oklahoma, Norman Campus 
The University of Texas at Arlington 
The University of Texas at Austin 
The University of Texas at El Paso 
The University of Texas at San Antonio 
University of Arizona 
University of California, Berkeley 
University of California, Davis 
University of California, Los Angeles 
 
University of Central Florida 
University of Florida 
University of Houston 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
University of Iowa 
University of Kentucky 
University of Maryland, College Park 
University of Minnesota, Twin Cities 
University of Nebraska - Lincoln 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
University of North Texas 
University of Washington, Seattle 
University of Wisconsin - Madison 
University of Wisconsin - Milwaukee 
Utah Valley University 
West Virginia University 
Western Kentucky University 
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